You can run but you cannot hide from memory: Extracting IM evidence of Android apps by Nisioti, Antonia et al.
You Can Run but You Cannot Hide from Memory: Extracting IM evidence of 
Android Apps
Antonia Nisioti, Alexios Mylonas, Vasilios Katos, 
Paul D. Yoo 
Department of Computer and Informatics 
Bournemouth University 
Bournemouth, United Kingdom 
{anisioti, amylonas, vkatos, pyoo}@bournemouth.ac.uk 
Anargyros Chryssanthou 
Hellenic Data Protection Authority  
Athens, Greece 
achrysanthou@dpa.gr
 
 
Abstract—Smartphones have become a vital part of our 
business and everyday life, as they constitute the primary 
communication vector. Android dominates the smartphone 
market (86.2%) and has become pervasive, running in ‘smart’ 
devices such as tablets, TV, watches, etc. Nowadays, instant 
messaging applications have become popular amongst 
smartphone users and since 2016 are the main way of messaging 
communication. Consequently, their inclusion in any forensics 
analysis is necessary as they constitute a source of valuable data, 
which might be used as (admissible) evidence. Often, their 
examination involves the extraction and analysis of the 
applications’ databases that reside in the device’s internal or 
external memory. The downfall of this method is the fact that 
databases can be tampered or erased, therefore the evidence 
might be accidentally or maliciously modified. In this paper, a 
methodology for retrieving instant messaging data from the 
volatile memory of Android smartphones is proposed, instead of 
the traditional database retrieval. The methodology is 
demonstrated with the use of a case study of four experiments, 
which provide insights regarding the behavior of such data in 
memory. Our experimental results show that a large amount of 
data can be retrieved from the memory, even if the device’s 
battery is removed for a short time. In addition, the retrieved 
data are not only recent messages, but also messages sent a few 
months before data acquisition. 
Keywords— Android; Android forensics; Memory forensics; 
Instant messaging apps 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Nowadays the use of mobile devices, such as smartphones, 
tablets etc., has increased and they have become pervasive. In 
just over 20 years, the number of mobile subscriptions has 
reached 7.4 billion [1], equal to the population of Earth (7.4 
million) [2]. Out of these devices, 3.4 billion are smartphones, 
a number that was estimated to surpass those of feature phones 
in the third quarter of 2016[1]. These devices contrary to 
feature phones, offer advanced processing and networking 
capabilities, instead of simply offering the ability to receive 
and place calls and SMS. In addition, smartphones offer a 
plethora of applications (or ‘apps’), which extend the 
functionality of the device. According to a study by Pearson et 
al. in [3], 13 percent of participants classified themselves as 
addicted to smartphones, with an average daily usage of 3.6 
hours per user. Furthermore, smartphones are not only popular 
among individual consumers but also governments and 
enterprises, as discussed in [4]. 
Nonetheless, one of the main reasons of using a smartphone 
is communication. In the past, voice calls and SMS were the 
communication vector, but nowadays Instant Messaging (IM) 
applications are the users’ preferred communication method. 
Specifically, chat application messaging had already overtaken 
SMS texts in 2012, when 19 billion messages were sent by 
applications of this type and 17.6 billion by SMS [5]. The user 
is not only able to send and receive text messages, but also 
create group conversations, place free calls, send pictures and 
videos, etc. IM apps are available in different operating 
systems (OS), in order to satisfy different types of smartphone 
users (e.g. iOS users, Android users, etc.). Android is the OS 
that dominates the smartphone market having an 86.2% market 
share, followed by iOS with 12.9% and Windows Phone with 
0.6% [6].  
 As discussed in [7], [8], a smartphone contains a plethora 
of heterogeneous user data (personal, business), and is 
therefore a valuable source of artefacts for a forensic analyst. 
One could compare a smartphone with a diary, as it contains 
every detail about the daily life of its owner, from calls and 
messages to GPS locations and internet history. Forensic 
examination of mobile devices is not an easy task, as it 
involves a variety of different hardware, operating systems and 
applications. Applications typically store their data either in the 
internal memory of the device or to an external SD card 
(frequently in a database). Both storage locations are easy to be 
logically modified / erased by a suspect, criminal or even 
another application. In this case the only remaining location 
where evidence might be still retrievable is the device’s 
physical memory (RAM). Memory forensics is a growing field 
of digital forensics and a vital part of every investigation 
involving desktop computers/laptops. For instance, fileless 
malware leaves no trace on the hard drive but its code needs to 
be loaded in memory to be executed. Likewise, ransomware 
encrypts the victim’s hard drive with a key that might be 
retrieved from memory in plain text [9]. Moreover, anti-
forensic technologies, such as encryption, can prevent an 
investigator from accessing evidence, but often memory 
forensics can recover encryption keys to help overcome this 
problem. Finally, the analysis of volatile data is becoming 
particularly important in modern devices in general, due to the 
proliferation of Web 2.0 and the underlying technologies [10]. 
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However, to the best of our knowledge, currently the use of 
memory forensics for retrieving data from Android instant 
messaging apps is very limited.  This paper presents a 
methodology for retrieving instant messaging data from the 
Random Access Memory of an Android mobile device. The 
methodology is applied with a case study that provides insights 
regarding the behavior of memory on such a device.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
provides background regarding Android OS, the related work 
of memory forensics and acquisition on this type of devices. 
Section 3 presents the methodology for the retrieval of instant 
messaging data from Android memory. Section 4 presents a 
case study where the proposed methodology is applied in four 
simulated scenarios and discusses the results of our 
experiments. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and 
discusses limitations and future work. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Android OS 
Android is an operating system created initially for mobile 
devices, such as smartphones and tablets, but nowadays it has 
become ubiquitous and popular in other ‘smart’ devices, e.g., 
cars, televisions and watches. Its kernel is Linux-based, but 
also includes components that are not typically found in a 
Linux kernel. Above the kernel, the libraries, the application 
framework and finally the applications are typically found [11]. 
All applications store their data in the /data directory. 
Android has a Linux Out-Of-Memory based task killer 
implemented in its kernel, the Low Memory Killer (LMK), 
which is responsible for the device’s memory management 
[12]. Once the RAM usage excesses a threshold, LMK starts 
killing processes to free memory [13]. When an application is 
launched it is stored in memory where it stays even if the user 
closes it, until the operating system decides it is necessary to 
remove it. The reason for this is to minimize the app’s response 
time, by letting the app run in RAM in the background, without 
affecting the battery or the performance of the device. This is 
particularly useful for IM apps, which have to receive real time 
messages and calls, regardless of whether they have been 
launched or not. For this reason, they are loaded along with 
their essential data to the memory after every boot. 
Consequently, IM data of these applications reside in the 
memory even after they are deleted, assuming no reboot has 
occurred in the meantime. 
B. Android Memory Analysis 
Currently, the examination of Android devices typically 
includes: a) logical acquisition that enables an examiner to 
access only the data permitted by the operating system (e.g., 
manually examine the databases of the installed applications 
and the user’s data [14]) and b) physical acquisition of the 
device with forensic software (e.g., XRY, Cellebrite, FTK 
Imager), in order to acquire data that cannot be retrieved with a 
logical acquisition – assuming that the device is not 
rooted/jailbroken – such as deleted files or system protected 
files [15]. The physical memory of a system is like a 
“photograph” of its state at the time of the acquisition. Memory 
of flagship (Android) smartphone devices nowadays contains 
considerable user and system activity that can remain,  
depending on conditions such as the power supply, the reboot 
frequency, etc. It is worth noting that typically smartphone 
users do not reboot or shutdown their device (contrary to 
desktops/laptops). Also, flagship (Android) smartphone 
devices nowadays contain a considerably large amount of 
memory, allowing more data to be stored and to reside in it 
until LMK decides to free the memory space that they occupy.  
Memory forensics is a growing field in digital forensics, as 
vital evidence might exist only in memory, while other data 
might continue to reside there even after their deletion from 
other sources. There is currently a limited number of tools 
capable of analyzing memory images (“memory dumps”) from 
Android devices. The simplest but still very useful method to 
extract data from a memory dump is with the Unix “strings” 
command. Unfortunately, this method restricts the analyst to 
data that can be interpreted as strings, such as words or phrases. 
Another method to extract data from a memory dump is to use 
the Volatility Framework [16], which is currently the ‘swiss-
army tool’ for memory analysis for academics, enterprises and 
law enforcement. Volatility is an extensible, cross-platform, 
modular platform written in Python. It enables analysts to 
analyse memory dumps from Linux, Windows, Mac and 
Android systems and entails a large variety of build-in and 
custom profiles and plugins. As a result of its extensibility and 
compatibility, it has a very large and active community of users 
and developers, which allows it to keep up with new 
technologies. Currently, there are only a few Linux–related 
plugins, which became compatible with Android memory 
images after the “address space” for ARM architecture was 
added to them [17], and most of them retrieve system data. 
Finally, another method of analyzing Android memory dumps 
is with the tool Volatilitux [18]. This tool is similar to 
Volatility, but targets only Linux systems and thus can be used 
for Android devices. It includes a limited set of five commands 
for listing and dumping processes, files related to them and 
their memory map. 
C. Linux and Android memory acquisition 
Formerly, Linux memory dumps were acquired by 
accessing the /dev/mem device file with the use of commands 
such as dd (with root privileges). Nowadays, on nearly all 
Linux distributions this feature is disabled for security reasons. 
Furthermore, this method allows the acquisition of only the 
first 896MB of RAM, even if more space is available. For this 
reason and due to the advent 64-bit systems, the /dev/mem 
memory acquisition method has been abandoned. Currently, 
three tools are mainly used to acquire the physical memory:  
i. fmem [19] that is a loadable kernel module and 
operates by creating the character device /dev/fmem 
which can be used by other programs (e.g., dd) to 
access the memory.  
ii. Linux Memory Extractor (LiME) [20] that creates a 
loadable kernel module (LKM) that runs within the 
kernel and dumps the content of RAM. In order to use 
LiME, the analyst has to cross-compile the LKM with 
the kernel of the device that will be acquired.  
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                              Fig. 1.  Summary of our methodology 
 
iii. Forensic Recovery of Scrambled Telephones 
(FROST) [21], a set of tools that perform cold boot 
attacks against Android devices in order to: a) retrieve 
disk encryption keys and other sensitive data from 
RAM and b) create a memory image. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
This section presents a methodology for the extraction of 
volatile data from Android instant messaging apps, which is 
summarized in Fig.1 Firstly, the memory of the device was 
acquired and then analysed by means of a hex editor to: (a) 
identify the data that existed in the memory dump, (b) identify 
and determine existing patterns, and (c) retrieve any 
conversations. Finally, further correlations were performed 
after the data retrieval.  
Acquisition. LiME was selected for the acquisition of the 
memory dumps and Android Device Bridge (ADB) was used 
to transfer the memory dump back to the investigator’s 
machine. As already mentioned, LiME creates a loadable 
kernel module (LKM), which has to be uploaded to the target 
device. A loadable kernel module is used to extend a running 
kernel, often to support new hardware, add a system call or 
access hardware. The procedure to create a LKM has three 
steps, namely: (a) obtain the appropriate source code for the 
device's kernel, (b) use the right toolchain to build the kernel 
from the source code, and (c) finally cross compile LiME with 
the built kernel, according to the instructions provided with it 
by the device’s manufacturer. The source code along with the 
necessary instructions about compiling, building and also the 
appropriate toolchain, can be found at the manufacture’s site in 
the case of official firmware, or at the developer’s site in the 
case of a custom rom. The result of the aforementioned 
procedure is a .ko (kernel object) file that has to be uploaded to 
the target device and run against it through a shell with the use 
of ADB.  
Pattern identification and regular expression creation. 
The simplest way of examining a memory dump is using a hex 
editor. The goal of this step is: i) to locate the messages in the 
file and then b) to identify the other data that exist along them 
and need to be retrieved, such as timestamps, data about the 
sender(s) or the receiver such as mobile numbers, IDs, etc. The 
aim of this step is to identify the patterns of the targeted data in 
multiple memory dumps, acquired in different days and times, 
in order to create accurate and non-circumstantial regular 
expressions to match them. The produced regular expressions 
are optimized with thorough testing to retrieve all the available 
messages and avoid false positives. As discussed in detail in 
Section 4, for each application more than one pattern might be 
observed during the analysis and, therefore, more than one 
regular expression might be used for the retrieval.  
Decoding, conversion and correlation. Initially, the 
retrieved data are not directly readable as they are in 
hexadecimal form. For example, timestamps must first be 
converted from hexadecimal to decimal, the last three digits 
should be removed as they are redundant and the outcome 
should be converted to date and time. In the case of names, 
messages and other data that represent text, data have to be 
decoded with UTF-8 or UTF-16, depending on the used 
language. Respectively, all the other retrieved data, should be 
decoded and/or converted to the appropriate form according to 
their type. As presented later in detail (see Section 4), after the 
aforementioned process further correlation can be performed 
on the retrieved information, in order to create more 
knowledge. For instance, from one message the sender’s name 
may be missing, but her ID might be present. In this case, her 
ID could be correlated to a linked list of retrieved IDs and 
names to identify the missing name.  
 
Fig. 2. Structure of the developed scripts for the retrieval of the targeted data 
IV. CASE STUDY 
This Section presents a case study in which the 
aforementioned methodology is used in order to collect 
evidence, which is created by the three most popular Android 
instant messaging apps. To perform the experiments that are 
described herein, a Samsung Galaxy III (GT-I9300) 
International was used, which is rooted and runs Cyanogenmod 
10.2 (Android level 4.3) [22]. The three applications that were 
selected are the most frequently used instant messaging 
applications according to [23], namely Facebook 
v.30.0.0.30.174, Viber v.5.4.0.2519, and WhatsApp v.2.12.144. 
Our experimental setup also includes as a host an Ubuntu 14.0 
LTS 64-bit desktop computer. It is worth noting that the 
smartphone that was used in the experiments does not contain a 
limited amount of dummy data, but instead contains real-life 
instant messaging history of one year, as it was used regularly 
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           Fig. 3. Example of a retrieved string containing instant messaging data 
 
before the experiments by one of the authors as the main 
device. Initially the device contained: 8159 individual 
WhatsApp messages, 12635 group WhatsApp messages, 12224 
Viber messages, 6243 individual Facebook Messenger 
messages and 2815 group Facebook Messenger messages. 
Five Python (v. 2.7) scripts were created for the retrieval of 
the instant messaging data, namely: two for WhatsApp (one for 
group chats and one for individual conversations), two for 
Facebook messenger and one for Viber. The structure of the 
scripts is presented in Fig. 2. Initially, the acquired memory 
dump is read as binary file. The message body along with the 
external communication data, which the script intents to 
retrieve as evidence, are stored in memory as one string. 
Consequently, in the second step a regex is used to find all the 
strings that match the appropriate pattern. This regex depends 
on a) the application that created the messages (i.e. Facebook, 
WhatsApp, and Viber) and b) on the type of conversation 
(group, individual) that the messages relate to (if applicable). 
As a result, a list of strings is created in the end of this step. In 
step three, each string is processed in order to retrieve and 
decode the desirable data, which will be stored in a database in 
the last step. Data of interest can be extracted from each string 
either with the use of regular expressions, or their offsets in the 
string (refer to Appendix A for the regexes that were used in 
this work). Data decoding depends on its type. For instance, 
names, numbers and text messages are converted from 
hexadecimal to UTF-8 or UTF-16, while UNIX timestamps are 
converted to decimal and then to time and date, taking into 
consideration the device’s timezone, which is also retrieved 
with a regex. 
Fig. 3, presents an instance of an individual Facebook 
Messenger conversation. The different data types inside the 
string are coloured differently and the name of the sender has 
been blurred. More specifically, date and time in Unix 
timestamp format is coloured in green, the message is in red, 
the sender’s name in yellow, the device’s owner id in orange 
(local id), the remote participant’s id (remote id) depicted in 
blue and the sender’s id in purple. Furthermore, the correlation 
between the three ids and the retrieved receivers’ names, can be 
used to identify the receiver’s id and name. The regular 
expression that can parse and extract the aforementioned data is 
given in the following regex provided in Snippet 1 and Table 1 
provides its breakdown (Appendix A includes the rest regexes 
that were used in this work). 
mid\x2E\d{13}:[0-9az]+ONE_TO_ONE:\d+: 
\d+[\x00-\xFF]{2,300}[{]"email":null, 
"user_key":"FACEBOOK:\d+","name": "[\x00-
\xFF]{2,50}"[}] 
Snippet 1: Regex for individual Facebook Messenger conversation 
As Table 1 suggests, some parts of the regular expression 
contain valuable data, such as the main body of the message, 
whereas others are just constant values, such as the first four 
characters “mid\x2E”. Also, the string contains a sub pattern 
(i.e. :[0-9a-z]+) that we were not able to interpret. 
Table 1. Break down of the regular expression used for retrieving Facebook 
Messenger conversations 
Regular Expression Valuable Info Type 
mid\x2E No Constant Value 
\d{13} Yes Message id/ Unix 
timestamp 
:[0-9a-z]+ Unknown Unknown 
ONE_TO_ONE: No Constant value 
\d+: Yes Remote id 
\d+ Yes Local id 
[\x00-\xFF]{2,300} Yes Main body of the 
message 
[{]"email":null,"user_key" 
:"FACEBOOK: 
No Constant value 
\d+ Yes  Sender’s id 
","name": No Constant value 
"[\x00-\xFF]{2,50}"[}] Yes Sender’s name 
 
Table 2. Hexadecimal, decoded and converted values of the string presented 
in Fig. 3 
Hex Value Decoded 
Value 
Converted 
Value 
Type 
31 34 35 30 37 37 
39 33 34 39 31 37 
38 
14507793491
78 
Tue, 22 
Dec 2015 
10:15:49 
GMT 
Message id/ 
Unix 
Timestamp 
35 38 35 34 39 34 
32 39 35 
585494295 - Remote id 
31 32 32 35 31 38 
32 35 34 37 
1225182547 - Local id 
74 68 69 73 20 6D 
65 73 73 61 67 65 
20 69 73 20 73 65 
6E 74 20 6F 6E 20 
44 65 63 65 6D 62 
65 72 20 32 32 
this message 
is sent on 
December 22 
- Main body of 
the message 
35 38 35 34 39 34 
32 39 35 
585494295 - Sender’s id 
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Fig. 4. Retrieved messages after a simple reboot (Experiment 1)  
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Fig. 6. Retrieved messages after a day of frequent usage (Experiment 3) 
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Fig. 5. Retrieved messages after battery removal (Experiment 2) 
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Fig. 7. Retrieved messages after a day of use and a reboot (Experiment 4) 
 
Our work suggests that Facebook Messenger uses two 
patterns to store individual conversations in memory. As 
discussed earlier, this has to be taken into consideration when 
creating the patterns for an instant messaging application in 
order to retrieve the maximum number of messages. After their 
extraction the data are decoded and converted. Table 2, 
presents the hexadecimal, decoded and converted values of the 
string that is shown in Fig. 3, omitting the name of the sender. 
The rest of this section presents the results from four 
experiments that were conducted to study the connection 
between the number of retrievable messages in the memory 
and the device’s time of operation, since the last reboot, as well 
as the effect of a reboot or the removal of the battery on it. 
The first memory dump was collected after a simple reboot 
of the device and without any application usage. The number 
of retrieved messages for each application are given in Fig. 4. 
The second memory dump was collected ten minutes after the 
first one, after the device was shut down, the battery was 
removed and replaced after 60 seconds, and the device was 
activated again. Again none of the applications was launched 
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after the activation. The purpose of this experiment is to 
“remove” the power of the RAM for an amount of time, in this 
case 60 seconds, and observe the effects on the number of the 
retrieved messages. It is worth noting that this work also 
examined the effect to data retrieval by the time before placing 
the battery back to the device, finding that time slots between 
10 seconds to 2 minutes provided similar results. As Fig. 5 
suggests, a huge amount of messages are retrievable despite the 
battery removal.  
The third memory dump was acquired a day after the 
second one and its results are presented in Fig. 6. As already 
mentioned previously in this Section, for the case study a real-
life device was used instead of a dummy one and so it was used 
regularly in the meantime between experiment two and three. 
The fourth and final memory dump was collected ten minutes 
after the previous one, after the device was rebooted and its 
results are presented in Fig. 7.  
Our results suggest that the amount of retrieved data does 
not vary significantly across the experiments. Specifically, 
when the battery was removed the results are almost identical 
(see Fig. 4 and 5). Furthermore, in the third experiment the 
amount of retrieved data is the lowest among the four (see 6). 
As this is the experiment where the device was used for a day 
without rebooting, this can be explained from the volatile 
nature of memory, as some parts of it need to be overwritten 
throughout the day. Both experiments 2 and 4 include the 
removal of device’s battery in an attempt to remove the power 
of the RAM and clear its contents. In contrast to what one 
would expect, Fig. 5 and 7 show a high volume of retrieved 
data. This can be justified from the way the operating system 
and its applications work. As discussed in section 2.1, instant 
messaging applications run in the background as they need to 
receive calls and messages in real-time, therefore, their data are 
loaded in memory after each reboot. Regarding the messages’ 
time of origin, it is worth mentioning that during the 
experiments not only recent but also older messages (up to 16 
months old) were retrieved. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Nowadays smartphones, especially Android devices, have 
become pervasive and are therefore part of our everyday life. 
As a result, they have become a great source of evidence in 
digital investigations. One popular communication vector with 
smartphones is instant messaging applications, whose usage 
has overcome the SMS since 2012. Therefore, the forensic 
analysis of their data has become more than necessary. In most 
cases, this analysis is based on the application’s databases, 
which are found in the device’s internal memory. However, 
these databases can be tampered or even erased (intentionally 
or not). In this case the use of memory forensics is vital, as it 
provides access to a different source of evidence and the ability 
of retrieving deleted or tampered evidence. Moreover, the 
increase of the memory size on smartphone devices along with 
the fact that most of the users do not reboot their devices makes 
the memory a source of valuable evidence, as nowadays 
evidence tends to reside in RAM without being replaced. 
This paper presented a methodology for the retrieval of 
instant messaging data from the memory of Android devices. It 
also provided a case study in which the methodology is used 
against four scenarios that serve the purpose of studying the 
behavior of such data on the memory. Our results reveal that a 
considerable volume of data can be retrieved from the memory 
of the device. It is worth noting that the messages that are 
recoverable are not only the recent ones, but also messages 
dated a few months before the memory dump.  
Our results are limited to Linux-based smartphones, such as 
Android devices. Unfortunately, the methodology cannot be 
performed on iOS devices, until their kernel source code 
becomes available and therefore their memory can be extracted 
using a LKM. However, Android currently has the biggest user 
base and can also be found in devices other than smartphones 
in which instant messaging apps can be installed, such as 
tablets, smart watches, etc. In addition, the acquisition of the 
memory in order to replicate of our work is a complicated and 
difficult process and therefore demands technical skills. It also 
demands a rooted device, as well as having the right kernel 
source code, which might not always be possible. Also, as the 
applications are frequently updated, the patterns might need to 
be also frequently updated. 
For future work we plan to update our regular expressions 
so they match the data patterns of the latest versions of the 
applications. Additionally, we plan to extend our work by 
including other popular instant messaging applications. Finally, 
we plan to examine further correlation and statistical analysis 
on the retrieved data in order to help the analyst identify the 
most important data. 
APPENDIX A 
This section presents the data that can be extracted from 
memory for each instant messaging app that is in the scope of 
our work and the regexes that were used to collect them. 
WhatsApp. Our work suggests that the following data are 
stored by this app in the RAM: 
• keyremoteid: Stores the senders id, as follows: a) in a 1-1 
chat includes the senders number with the suffix 
@s.whatsapp.net, b) in a group chat includes the group’s 
id, which is created by the number of the groups admin 
(i.e., the user that created the group) and the prefix @g.us. 
• timestamp: stores the time and date that the message was 
read or send 
• keyid: stores the message id 
• sendfromme: Boolean value that is 1 when the device 
has sent the message 
• message: stores the body of the message 
• remotesource: stores the senders id in a group chat 
(similarly to keyremoteid), otherwise defaults to -1 
• timereceived: stores the date and time that the message 
was received 
• receipt_server_timestamp: stores the time and date that 
the messages was read. This field will have a value only 
in the case of an outbound message 
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In the case of 1-1 chats the following regular expression is 
used in order to parse incoming messages: 
\d{12}@s.whatsapp.net\d{10}[-]\d [\x00-
\xFF]{2,300}\x01[\x00-\xFF]{5}\x30\x01 [\x00-
\xFF]{5}\xFF{2} 
 
Specifically, the regex identifies the following data: 
• a 12-digit integer and the suffix @s.whatsapp.net, which 
constitutes the keyremoteid field 
• a ten digit interger followed by a ‘-’ and a one-digit 
integer that form the message’s keyid 
• 2 to 300 hex numbers that hold the message’s body 
(irrespective of the language that is used) 
• Six hex numbers starting with 0x01, which constitutes the 
timestamp field 
• a constant hex number 0x30 
• six hex numbers starting with 0x01 that stores the 
timereceived field 
• 0xFFFF which terminates the message’s string 
In the case of 1-1 chats the following regular expression is 
used to parse outgoing messages: 
 
\d{12}@s.whatsapp.net\d{10}[-]\d [\x00-
\xFF]{2,300}\x01[\x00-\xFF]{5}\x30\x01 [\x00-
\xFF]{5}\xFF\x01 [\x00-\xFF]{5} 
 
This regex is similar to the one that parses incoming message 
strings, differentiating after the timestamp field as follows: 
• 0xFF that works as a separator 
• Six hex numbers starting with 0x01 that store the 
receipt_server_timestamp field 
In the case of group chats the following regular expression 
is used in order to parse incoming messages: 
 
\d{12}[-]\d{10}@g.us\d{10}[-]\d [\x00-
\xFF]{2,300}\x01[\x00-\xFF] {5}\x30 
\d{12}@s.whatsapp.net\x01 [\x00-\xFF]{5} 
 
Specifically, the regex identifies the following data: 
• a 12-digit integer followed by a ‘-’, a one-digit integer 
and the suffix @g.us, which constitutes the group’s 
keyremoteid field  
• a ten digit integer followed by a ‘-’ and a one-digit integer 
that form the message’s keyid 
• 2 to 300 hex numbers that hold the message’s body 
(irrespective of the language that is used) 
• Six hex numbers starting with 0x01, which constitute the 
timestamp field 
• a constant hex number 0x30,  
• six hex numbers starting with 0x01 that store the 
timereceived field 
• a 12 digit integer follow by @s.whatsapp.net, which 
constitute the remotesource field 
• Six hex numbers starting with 0x01 that constitute the 
timereceived field 
In the case of group chats the following regular expression 
is used in order to parse outgoing messages: 
 
\d{12}[-]\d{10}@g.us\d{10}[-]\d{1,3} 
\x04[\x00-\xFF]{2,300}\x01 [\x00-\xFF] 
{5}\x30\x01 [\x00-\xFF]{5}\xFF\x01 [\x00-
\xFF]{5} 
 
Similarly to what has been described earlier, this regex is 
similar to the one that parses incoming message strings for 
group messages, with the following differences: 
• the 0x04 value resides between the keyid field and the 
message body 
• Since this is an outgoing message remotesource field does 
not exist after the timestamp and 0x30, instead similarly 
to the second regex the following fields are: timereceived 
and receipt_server_timestamp 
Viber. Our work suggests that the following data are stored 
by this app in the RAM: 
• number: this field stores the number of the second 
communication party (where the first communication 
party is the device that has been acquired) 
• message: this field includes the message’s body 
• date:  stores the receipt timestamp 
• token: this field stores a unique token for each message 
The following regular expression is used to parse Viber 
messages:  
 
[+]\d{12}\x01[\x00-\xFF]{5}\x02 [\x00-
\xFF]{2,300}\x74\x65\x78\x74 
 
Specifically, the regex identifies the following data: 
• the character ‘+’  followed by a 12-digit integer that form 
the number field 
• Six hex numbers starting with 0x01, which constitutes the 
date field 
• a constant hex number 0x02 
• 2 to 300 hex numbers that hold the message’s body and 
the token field, which have to be split and decoded  
• the hex value of the string “text” that terminates the string 
of each message 
Facebook Messenger. Our work suggests that the following 
data are stored by this app in the RAM: 
• Timestamp: this field stores the date and time that the 
message was received 
• Recipientid: includes the receiver’s id, which is present 
only in 1-1 messages 
• Senderid: includes the sender’s id 
• Recipientname: includes the receiver’s name 
• Sendername: includes the sender’s name 
• Message: this field stores the body of the message 
• Groupid: includes the group’s id (only present in group 
chats) 
• Groupparticipants: this field includes the names of the  
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group’s participants (only present in group chats) 
The following regular expression is used to parse 1-1 
Facebook Messenger messages: 
 
mid\x2E\d{13}:[0-9a-z]+ONE_TO_ONE:\d+ 
:\d+[\x00-\xFF]{8}[\x00-\xFF]{2,300} 
[{]"email":"\d+@facebook.com","user_key":"FACE
BOOK:\d+","name":"[\x00-\xFF]{2,50}"[}] 
The structure of this regex is analysed in Section 4. 
To parse group messages in Facebook Messenger two 
regexes are needed, namely: a) one that recovers the data of 
the message itself and b) one that recovers the app specific 
actions of the group members (e.g. add participant, leave the 
group, name the group, etc.).  
The following regular expression is used to parse group 
messages created by Facebook Messenger: 
 
mid\x2E\d{13}:[0-9a-z]+GROUP:\d+ [\x00-
\xFF]{8}[\x00\xFF]{2,300}[{]"email": 
"\d+@facebook.com","user_key":"FACEBOOK:\d+","
name":"[\x00-\xFF]{2,50}"[}] 
 
This regex is similar to the regular expression that is used 
to parse 1-1 Facebook Messenger messages, differentiating 
with the substring “GROUP” instead of “ONE_TO_ONE”. 
 
Finally, the following regular expression is use to parse 
group actions: 
 
m_action:\d{13}\x30{6}GROUP:\d+[\x00\xFF]{8}[\
x00\xFF]{1,300}[{]"email":"\d+@facebook.com","
user_key":"FACEBOOK:\d+","name ":"[\x00-
\xFF]{2,50}"[}] 
 
This regular expression is similar to the two previous 
regexes and identifies the following data: 
• it starts with the substring “m_action” instead of “mid” 
• 13 digits that store the timestamp similarly to the previous 
regexes 
• 6 hex values 
• the rest of the regex is similar to the previous regex 
Timezone. In all three instant messaging apps the 
following regex was used in order to recover the device’s 
timezone, namely: 
 
setTimeZone+[=]+[a-zA-Z/]{2,} 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] Ericsson Mobility Report, June 2016 
[2] 2016 World Population Data Sheet, Population Reference Bureau, 
August 2016 
[3] Pearson, C., & Hussain, Z. (2015). Smartphone use, addiction, 
narcissism, and personality: A mixed methods investigation. 
International Journal of Cyber Behavior, Psychology and Learning 
(IJCBPL), 5(1), 17-32. 
[4] Grover, J. (2013). Android forensics: Automated data collection and 
reporting from a mobile device. Digital Investigation, 10, S12-S20. 
[5] Informa, 2013: http://www.informa.com/  
[6] Gartner , Market Share Alert: Preliminary, Mobile Phones, Worldwide, 
2Q16 
[7] Mylonas, A., Meletiadis, V., Tsoumas, B., Mitrou, L., & Gritzalis, D. 
(2012, June). Smartphone forensics: A proactive investigation scheme 
for evidence acquisition. In IFIP International Information Security 
Conference (pp. 249-260). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
[8] Mylonas, A., Meletiadis, V., Mitrou, L., & Gritzalis, D. (2013). 
Smartphone sensor data as digital evidence. Computers & Security, 38, 
51-75. 
[9] Ligh, M. H., Case, A., Levy, J., & Walters, A. (2014). The art of 
memory forensics: detecting malware and threats in windows, linux, and 
mac memory. John Wiley & Sons. 
[10] Barmpatsalou, K., Damopoulos, D., Kambourakis, G., & Katos, V. 
(2013). A critical review of 7 years of Mobile Device Forensics. Digital 
Investigation, 10(4), 323-349. 
[11] Android Developers: https://developer.android.com/ 
[12] Singh, A., Agrawal, A. V., & Kanukotla, A. (2016, January). A method 
to improve application launch performance in Android devices. In 
Internet of Things and Applications (IOTA), International Conference 
on (pp. 112-115). IEEE. 
[13] Nomura, S., Nakamura, Y., Sakamoto, H., Hamanaka, S., & Yamaguchi, 
S. (2014, October). Improving choice of processes to terminate in 
Android OS. In 2014 IEEE 3rd Global Conference on Consumer 
Electronics (GCCE) (pp. 624-625). IEEE. 
[14] Al Mutawa, N., Baggili, I., & Marrington, A. (2012). Forensic analysis 
of social networking applications on mobile devices. Digital 
Investigation, 9, S24-S33. 
[15] J. Lessard & G. Kessler (2010), Android Forensics: Simplifying Cell 
Phone Examinations, Purdue University 
[16] The Volatility Foundation: http://www.volatilityfoundation.org/ 
[17] Joe Sylve , Andrew Case , Lodovico Marziale , Golden G. Richard 
(2011), Acquisition and analy-sis of volatile memory from android 
devices, Digital Investigation 
[18] Girault, E. (2010). Volatilitux: Physical memory analysis of Linux 
systems. 
[19] Github fmem: https://github.com/NateBrune/fmem 
[20] Sylve, J. (2012, January). Lime-linux memory extractor. In Proceedings 
of the 7th ShmooCon conference. 
[21] Müller, T., & Spreitzenbarth, M. (2013, June). Frost. In International 
Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security (pp. 373-
388). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
[22] CyanogenMod: http://cyanogenmod.org/  
[23] Most popular messaging apps 2016, Statista April 2016: 
https://www.statista.com
 
2017 IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC)
